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of FD jamming, for a wide range of system conditions. However, when SI can efficiently be mitigated,
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2I. INTRODUCTION
The information security of wireless communication systems is currently addressed via cryp-
tographic approaches, at the upper layers of the protocol stack. However, these approaches are
prone to attack due to the ever-increasing computational capability of the digital processors, and
suffer from the issues regarding management and distribution of secret keys [1], [2]. Alternatively,
physical layer security takes advantage of physical characteristics of the communication medium
in order to provide a secure data exchange between the information transmitter (Alice) and the
legitimate receiver (Bob). In the seminal work by Wyner [3], the concept of secrecy capacity
is introduced for a three-node degraded wiretap channel, as the maximum information rate that
can be exchanged under the condition of perfect secrecy. It is shown that a positive secrecy
capacity is achievable when the physical channel to the eavesdropper is weaker than the channel
to the legitimate receiver. The arguments of [3] have since been extended in the directions of
secrecy rate region analysis for various wiretap channel models [4]–[6], construction of capacity
achieving channel codes [7]–[9], as well as signal processing techniques for enhancing the secrecy
capacity, see [10]–[15] and references therein. As a result, physical layer security is considered
as a possible solution for providing information security in different use cases for future wireless
communication systems, e.g., [16], [17].
As a promising method to enhance the secrecy capacity of wireless communication systems,
Goel and Negi [10] have introduced the idea of friendly jamming, i.e., the transmission of an
artificially-generated noise (AN) with the intention of degrading the decoding capability of the
eavesdropper. This can be implemented via i) the joint transmission of information and AN from
Alice, however, requiring an effective beamforming capability at Alice and sharing the commu-
nication and jamming resources [10], [11], ii) utilization of external (cooperative) jammers,
nonetheless, resulting in the issues of jammer mobility, synchronization, and trustworthiness
[5], [12]–[15], and iii) via the application of full-duplex (FD) nodes [2]. An FD transceiver is
capable of transmission and reception at the same time and frequency band, however, suffering
from the strong SI which is caused by its own transmitter. The recently developed methods for
self-interference cancellation (SIC) [18]–[20], have demonstrated practical implementations of
FD transceivers in the last few years, employing various techniques including passive isolation,
antenna design and placement, and analog and digital signal processing methods. The implemen-
May 2, 2019 DRAFT
3tation in [20] achieves a SIC level of 110, complying with the IEEE 802.11ac (WiFi) standard.
The extension of the aforementioned works for multiple antenna transceivers have been studied in
[21]–[23] for different setups, and motivated a wide range of related applications, see [24] and the
references therein. In this regard, a FD Bob can act as a friendly jammer, while simultaneously
receiving information from Alice. Note that a FD jammer does not occupy the communication
resources from Alice, nor does it rely on the external helpers, resolving the related drawbacks.
The problems regarding secrecy rate region analysis and resource optimization have hence been
addressed in [2], [25]–[30]. It is observed that a significant gain is achievable, in terms of the
resulting secrecy capacity via the utilization of a FD jamming strategy under the condition that
the SI signal can be attenuated effectively.
Although the available literature introduces a gainful utilization of FD transceivers for en-
hancing the system’s secrecy capacity, the aforementioned gain comes at the expense of a
higher power consumption due to i) the implementation of a SIC scheme at the FD transceiver,
incurring additional digital processing and analog circuitry, ii) the power consumed for the
transmission of AN, as well as iii) the degrading impact of residual self-interference on the
desired communication link. As a result, it is not clear how the FD jamming-enabled systems
perform in terms of secrecy energy efficiency (SEE). Note that the issue of energy efficiency
is recently raised as a key criteria in the design of wireless communication systems. This
is justified by the exponential increase of information and communication technology (ICT)
services, currently generating around 5% of global CO2 emissions and with an expected share
of 75% for wireless systems in 2020, which calls for novel energy efficient ICT solutions [31],
[32]. Hence, it is the main purpose of this paper to investigate if and how the application of FD
jammers can enhance the system’s SEE, in terms of the securely communicated bits per Joule
(SBPJ).
A. Contribution and paper organization
• In this work, we study an SEE [SBPJ] maximization problem for a general MIMOME setup,
where the legitimate receiver is capable of FD jamming. This stays in contrast to available
designs which utilize FD transceivers for improving the secrecy capacity [25]–[30] or the
studies on the SEE of half-duplex (HD) networks [33]–[35], [37]. Due to the intractable
problem structure, an iterative algorithm is proposed, with a guaranteed convergence to a
point satisfying the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of the original problem.
May 2, 2019 DRAFT
4• The joint utilization of FD capabilities, both on Alice and Bob, for jamming and bi-directional
information exchange, shows additional potential for SEE improvement. This is grounded on
the fact that, firstly, the FD jamming power is reused for both communication directions,
resulting in power-efficient jamming, and secondly, the coexistence of two communication
directions on the same channel may degrade Eve’s decoding capability. Motivated by this, the
proposed iterative algorithm is extended for a bidirectional FD setup.
• In order to account for channel state information (CSI) uncertainties, the consideration of
statistical CSI regarding the channels to Eve has been introduced in [37], [40], considering
HD nodes. However, the aforementioned works limit the studied setups to a single antenna Eve,
where CSI statistics follow a specific fast-fading nature. In this work an SEE maximization
problem is studied for a FD-enabled MIMOME setup, where the channels to Eve follow an
arbitrary statistical distribution. Note that unlike the fast-fading condition, which assumes the
CSI is not available due to mobility, the consideration of an arbitrary statistical distribution
also accounts for the scenarios where Eve is stationary, but Eve’s CSI cannot be obtained due
to the lack of collaboration from Eve. Hence, we propose a successive selection and statistical
lower bound maximization (SSSLM) algorithm, utilizing a combination of sample average
approximation [41], and successive lower bound approximation method [42], with the goal
of maximizing the statistical average SEE. The algorithm is proven to converge to a point
satisfying the KKT conditions of the original problem.
The numerical results indicate only a marginal SEE gain, through the utilization of FD jamming,
for a wide range of system parameters. However, the observed SEE gain is notable for systems
with a small distance between the FD node and the eavesdropper, a high signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR), or for a bidirectional FD communication setup, if SI can efficiently be mitigated.
The studied system model is defined in Section II. When only the legitimate receiver (Bob)
is capable of FD jamming, an SEE maximization framework is introduced in Section III, and
then extended to a bidirectional FD communication setup in Section IV. In Section V, an SEE
maximization framework is introduced for the case when the channels to the eavesdropper are
not accurately known. The behavior of the proposed algorithms, as well as the impact of the FD
jamming on the SEE performance are numerically studied in Section VI. This paper is concluded
in Section VII by summarizing the main results.
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Figure 1. The studied wiretap channel. Alice and the FD-Bob are jointly enabled with jamming capability.
B. Mathematical notation
Throughout this paper, column vectors and matrices are denoted as lower-case and upper-case
bold letters, respectively. Mathematical expectation, trace, determinant, and Hermitian transpose
are denoted by E(·), tr(·), | · |, and (·)H , respectively. The Kronecker product is denoted by ⊗.
The identity matrix with dimension K is denoted as IK and vec(·) operator stacks the elements
of a matrix into a vector. Moreover, (·)−1 represents the inverse of a matrix and || · ||2, || · ||F
respectively represent the Euclidean and Frobenius norms. 0m×n represents an all-zero matrix
with size m× n. diag(·) returns a diagonal matrix by putting the off-diagonal elements to zero.
⊥ denotes statistical independence. The set FK is defined as {1, 2, . . . , K}, and |X| denotes
the size of the set X. The set of positive real numbers, the set of complex numbers, and the
set of all positive semi-definite matrices with Hermitian symmetry are denoted by R+, C and
H, respectively. a? indicates the value of a for which optimality holds. The value of {x}+ is
equal to x, if positive, and zero otherwise. Furthermore, CN (x,X) denotes the complex normal
distribution with mean x and covariance X.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a MIMOME wiretap channel that consists of a legitimate transmitter, i.e., Alice,
a legitimate receiver, i.e., Bob, and an eavesdropper, i.e., Eve, see Fig. 1. Alice and Eve are
equipped with NA transmit and ME receive antennas, respectively. Bob is respectively equipped
with NB and MB transmit and receive antennas, and is capable of FD operation. Note that the
FD operation at Bob does not indicate an FD communication, as Alice is assumed to be an HD
node in this section. However, the FD capability at Bob is used to send a jamming signal while
receiving information, and thereby to degrade the decoding capability at the undesired receiver.
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6The joint FD operation at Alice and Bob, facilitating an FD communication, is later introduced
in Section IV. Channels are assumed to follow a quasi-stationary1 and flat-fading model. In
this regard, channel from Alice to Bob, Alice to Eve, and Bob to Eve (jamming channel) are
respectively denoted as Hab ∈ CMB×NA , Hae ∈ CME×NA , Hbe ∈ CME×NB . The channel from
Bob to Bob, i.e., self-interference channel, is denoted as Hbb ∈ CMB×NB .
A. Signal model
The transmission from Alice includes the information-containing signal, intended for Bob,
and an AN signal2, intended to degrade the reception by Eve. This is expressed as
xa = qa + wa︸ ︷︷ ︸
ua
+etx,a, (1)
where ua ∈ CNA is the intended transmit signal, qa ∼ CN (0NA ,Qa) and wa ∼ CN (0NA ,Wa)
respectively represent the information-containing and AN signal, and xa ∈ CNA is the combined
transmitted signal from Alice. The transmit distortion, denoted as etx,a ∈ CNA models collective
impact of transmit chain inaccuracies, e.g., digital-to-analog converter noise, power amplifier
(PA) noise, oscillator phase noise, see Subsection II-B for more details. Note that the role of
hardware inaccuracies becomes important in a system with FD transceivers, due to the impact
of a strong self-interference channel. Similar to the transmission from Alice, the transmission
of AN by Bob is expressed as
xb = wb + etx,b, (2)
where wb ∼ CN (0NB ,Wb) is the transmitted artificial noise and etx,b ∈ CNB represents the
transmit distortions from Bob. Via the application of (1) and (2) the received signal at Eve is
expressed as
ye = Haexa + Hbexb + ne = Haeqa + ce, (3)
where ne ∼ CN
(
0ME , σ
2
n,eIME
)
is the additive thermal noise and
ce := Haewa + Hbewb + Haeetx,a + Hbeetx,b + ne (4)
1It means that the channel remains constant within a frame, but may change from one frame to another.
2Unlike the data symbols, which follow a known constellation, the AN is generated from a pseudo-random sequence which
is not known to the receivers, see [10, Section III]. This ensures that Eve cannot decode the AN.
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7is the collective interference-plus-noise at Eve. Similarly, the received signal at Bob is formulated
as
yb = Habxa + Hbbxb + nb︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ub
+erx,b, (5)
where nb ∼ CN
(
0MB , σ
2
n,bIMB
)
is the additive thermal noise, and ub is the received signal,
assuming perfect hardware operation. Similar to the transmit side, the receiver side distortion,
denoted as erx,b ∈ CMB , models the collective impact of receiver chain inaccuracies, e.g.,
analog-to-digital converter noise, oscillator phase noise, and automatic gain control error, see
Subsection II-B. Note that yb includes the received self-interference signal at Bob, originating
from the same transceiver. Hence, the known, i.e., distortion-free, part of the self-interference can
be subtracted applying a SIC method [20], [22]. The received signal at Bob, after the application
of SIC is hence written as
y˜b = yb −Hbbwb
= Habxa + Hbbetx,b + erx,b + nb = Habqa + cb, (6)
where
cb := Habwa + Habetx,a + Hbbetx,b + erx,b + nb, (7)
is the collective interference-plus-noise at Bob.
B. Distortion signal statistics
Similar to [43], we model the impact of transmit (receive) chain inaccuracies by injecting
Gaussian-distributed and independent distortion terms at each antenna3. Moreover, the variance
of the distortion signals are proportional to the power of the intended transmit (receive) signal
at the corresponding chain. This model is elaborated in [43, Subsections C], [44], [45] regarding
the characterization of hardware impairments in transmit chains, and in [43, Subsections D],
[46] for the receiver chains. This is expressed in our system as
etx,a ∼ CN
(
0NA , κadiag
(
E
{
uau
H
a
}))
, etx,a⊥ua, (8)
etx,b ∼ CN
(
0NB , κbdiag
(
E
{
wbw
H
b
}))
, etx,b⊥wb, (9)
erx,b ∼ CN
(
0MB , βbdiag
(
E
{
ubu
H
b
}))
, erx,b⊥ub, (10)
3Eve is assumed to operate with a zero-distortion hardware, considering a worst-case scenario.
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8Σb = E{cbcHb } = HabWaHHab + κaHabdiag (Qa + Wa)HHab + κbHbbdiag (Wb)HHbb
+ βbdiag
(
Hab (Qa + Wa)H
H
ab + HbbWbH
H
bb + σ
2
n,bIMB
)
+ σ2n,bIMB , (15)
Σe = E{cecHe } = HaeWaHHae + HbeWbHHbe + κaHaediag (Qa + Wa)HHae + κbHbediag (Wb)HHbe + σ2n,eIME .
(16)
where κa, κb, βb ∈ R+ are distortion coefficients, relating the variance of the distortion terms to
the intended signal power, and ua and ub are defined in (1) and (5), respectively. For further
elaborations on the used distortion model please see [43], [47]–[49], and the references therein.
C. Power consumption model
The consumed power of a wireless transceiver can be segmented into three parts. First, the
power consumed at the PA, which is related to the effective transmit power via the PA efficiency,
see [50, Eq. (2)]. Secondly, the zero-state power, i.e., the power consumed by other circuit blocks,
independent from the transmission status4, see [50, Eq. (3)]. And finally, the power consumed
for the implementation of a SIC scheme, to enable FD operation. The aforementioned power
varies for different SIC methods, and by definition, is not relevant for HD transceivers. The
consumed power for Alice and Bob can hence be expressed as
PA (Qa,Wa) =
1 + κa
µA
tr (Qa + Wa) + PA,0, PA ≤ PA,max (11)
and
PB (Wb) =
1 + κb
µB
tr (Wb) + PB,0 + PFD, PB ≤ PB,max. (12)
In the above arguments, PX , PX ,0, µX , and PX ,max, where X ∈ {A,B}, respectively represent
the consumed power, the zero-state power, PA efficiency, and the maximum allowed power
consumption for each node. The additional required power for the implementation of a SIC
scheme is denoted by PFD. From (11) and (12), the total system power consumption is obtained
as
Ptot (Qa,Wa,Wb) = PA (Qa,Wa) + PB (Wb) . (13)
4This includes, e.g., the power consumed at receiver chain, and for base band processing.
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9D. Secrecy energy efficiency
Following [2], [6], [10], the achievable secrecy rate5 for Alice-Bob communication is expressed
as Cab =
{
C˜ab
}+
, such that
C˜ab = log
∣∣I + HabQaHHabΣ−1b ∣∣− log ∣∣I + HaeQaHHaeΣ−1e ∣∣ , (14)
where Σb, Σe are given in (15), (16), and represent the covariance of the interference-plus-
noise terms at Bob and Eve, respectively. The SEE, as a measure of securely communicated
information per energy unit, is consequently expressed as
SEE =
Cab
Ptot
. (17)
It is the intention of the remaining sections of this paper to improve the efficiency of the defined
wiretap channel, in terms of the SEE, and provide comparison between FD and usual HD
strategies.
Remark II.1. In this part, we have introduced an MIMOME wiretap channel, where Bob is
capable of FD operation and sends a jamming signal in order to improve the information
security. However, this does not facilitate an FD communication, as Alice remains an HD node.
This setup is relevant in the practical asymmetric scenarios, e.g., the uplink of an FD cellular
communication system [36], where users are usually not capable of FD operation. The setup with
the joint FD operation at Alice and Bob, facilitating a joint jamming and an FD bidirectional
communication, is later discussed in Section IV.
Remark II.2. In this part we assume the availability of exact CSI for all channels, relevant to the
scenarios with a collaborative eavesdropper, e.g., [51], [52]. The scenario with the availability
of partial CSI is discussed in Section V.
Remark II.3. Unlike the data symbols, which follow a known constellation, the AN is generated
from a pseudo-random sequence which is not known to the receivers, see [10, Section III]. This
ensures that Eve may not decode the AN and hence, cannot cancel the interference caused by
the AN transmissions
5The system’s secrecy capacity is lower bounded by all achievable secrecy rates, resulting from different choices of transmit
covariance matrices, see [6, Theorem 1], [10, Equation (6)].
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III. SECRECY ENERGY EFFICIENCY MAXIMIZATION
In this part we intend to enhance the system SEE, assuming the availability of CSI for all
channels. The corresponding optimization problem is defined as
max
Qa,Wa,Wb
SEE (Qa,Wa,Wb) (18a)
s.t. PA (Qa,Wa) ≤ PA,max, PB (Wb) ≤ PB,max, Qa,Wa,Wb ∈ H, (18b)
where (18b) represent the power constraints at Alice and Bob, see (11), (12). The defined
problem in (18) is not tractable in the current form, due to the non-convex and non-smooth
objective. In order to obtain a tractable structure, without loss of optimality, we remove the non-
linear operator {}+ from the definition of SEE6. The modified SEE, named SEEp hereinafter,
can hence be formulated as
SEEp (Qa,Wa,Wb) =
ΣX∈{b,e}αX
(
log
∣∣ΣX + HaXQaHHaX ∣∣− log |ΣX |)
Ptot (Qa,Wa,Wb)
, (19)
where αb = 1 and αe = −1. It is observed that SEEp is a difference of concave (DC) over
affine fractional function which is intractable in the current form. In the following we propose
a successive general inner approximation algorithm (SUIAP) to obtain a KKT solution to (18),
i.e., a solution satisfying the KKT optimality conditions.
A. SUIAP
The proposed SUIAP algorithm consists of two nested loops. The detailed procedure is
explained in the following.
1) Initialization: In this section we briefly discuss the initialization of Algorithm 1. We separate
the choice of spatial beams and power allocation for different transmissions, in order to obtain
a fast solution.
2) Spatial adjustment: The role of the transmit spatial adjustment is to direct the transmit signal
to the desired receiver, while preventing leakage to the undesired directions. This is written as
the following maximization
max
Q
tr
(
FQFH
)
+ νf
tr (GQGH) + νg
, s.t. tr (Q) = 1, (20)
6Note that at the optimality of (18), the resulting Cs, and consequently the SEE is non-negative. This is since a non-negative
SEE is immediately obtained by setting Qa = 0, see Lemma IV.1 for a generalized proof.
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CLB,ab
(
Q[i],Q[j]
)
:= log
∣∣Σb (Q[i])+ HabQ[i]a HHab∣∣− log ∣∣Σb (Q[j])∣∣+ log ∣∣Σe (Q[i])∣∣
+ tr
((
Σe
(
Q[j]
)
+ HaeQ
[j]
a H
H
ae
)−1(
Σe
(
Q[j]
)−Σe (Q[i])+ Hae(Q[j]a −Q[i]a )HHae))
+ tr
((
Σb
(
Q[j]
))−1 (
Σb
(
Q[j]
)−Σb (Q[i])))− log ∣∣Σe (Q[j])+ HaeQ[j]a HHae∣∣ (24)
where Q represents the normalized covariance matrix, F and G are the desired and undesired
channels, and νf , νg are the noise variances at the desired and undesired receivers, respectively.
An optimal solution to (20) can be obtained as
vec
(
Q?
1
2
)
= Pmax
((
I⊗GHG + νgI
)−1 (
I⊗ FHF + νfI
))
. (21)
where Pmax (·) calculates the dominant eigenvector. Note that the above approach is applied sep-
arately for the spatial adjustment of Qa,Wa and Wb. The corresponding desired and undesired
channels are defined in Appendix B-A.
3) Power allocation: The transmit power adjustment for Qa,Wa and Wb is obtained by
applying the normalized covariance in the previous part as the basis. Afterwards, the power for
each transmission is optimized to maximize SEEp, see Appendix B-B.
4) Outer loop: In each outer iteration, the optimization problem (18) is approximated by
replacing the objective with an effective lower bound to SEEp, following the successive inner
approximation (SIA) framework [53]. This is implemented by applying the inequality
−log |X| ≥ −log |Y|+ tr (Y−1 (Y −X)) (22)
obtained from the first-order Taylor approximation of the convex terms −log |X| at the point
X = Y. The approximated optimization problem at the l-th outer iteration is consequently
expressed as
max
Q[l]
CLB,ab
(
Q[l],Q[l−1]?
)
/Ptot
(
Q[l]
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤SEEp(Q[l])
s.t. (18b), (23)
where Q[X] :=
{
Q
[X]
a ,W
[X]
a ,W
[X]
b
}
, with X specifying an iteration instance. Moreover, CLB,ab
is given in (24) and Q[l−1]? represents the obtained solution at the previous outer iteration.
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5) Inner loop: The inner loop is dedicated to optimally solve the approximated problem at
each outer iteration via the well-known Dinkelbach’s algorithm [55], as (23) belongs to the class
of concave-over-affine fractional programs [54]. In particular, the optimum solution is obtained
via a sequence of parametric variable updates, see Appendix A for elaboration on the related
class of fractional programs and the detailed procedure. The main steps associated with the
Dinkelbach’s algorithm, i.e., Steps 3 and 5 from Algorithm 3, can be expressed as the following
updates:
Q[l,k]? ← argmax
Q[l,k]
CLB
(
Q[l,k],Q[l−1]?
)
− λ[l,k−1]?Ptot
(
Q[l,k]
)
s.t. (18b), (25)
λ[l,k]
? ← CLB,ab
(
Q[l,k]?,Q[l−1]?
)
/Ptot
(
Q[l,k]?
)
, (26)
associated with the l-th outer iteration and k-th inner iteration.
It is observed that (25) is a jointly convex problem over the optimization variables Q[k,l]
and can efficiently be implemented via the MAX-DET algorithm [56], whereas (26) can be
obtained via direct evaluation. The defined algorithm steps, both outer and inner loop iterations,
are continued until a jointly stable point is obtained, see Algorithm 1 for more details.
6) Convergence: Via the application of the Dinkelbach’s algorithm on the class of concave-
over-affine fractional programs, the iterations of the inner loop converge to a globally optimum
solution for (23). This follows from the strictly monotonic nature of the auxiliary function (23),
and the convexity of the update (25). For more information please see Appendix A and the
references therein. The following lemmas reveal the nature of the convergence at the outer loop.
Lemma III.1. (SIA sequence: [53, Theorem 1]) Consider the optimization problem
min
x
g0(x) s.t. gi(x) ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, (27)
where gi : Rn → R+ and gi : Rn → R are differentiable but potentially non-convex functions.
Furthermore, consider the differentiable functions (∀i) g¯i, approximating gi at x0, such that
(i) gi(x) ≤ g¯i(x,x0), (ii) gi(x0) = g¯i(x0,x0) and (iii) ∂gi(x0)/∂x = ∂g¯i(x0,x0)/∂x. Then,
upon the feasibility of an initial value x[0], the sequence of approximate convex optimization
problems
x[k]
? ← argmin
x[k]
g¯0
(
x[k],x[k−1]
?
)
s.t. g¯i
(
x[k],x[k−1]
?
)
≤ 0, i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, (28)
converges to a point satisfying the KKT conditions of the original problem (27).
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Proof: The proof follows from two observations. Firstly, the sequence of g0(x[k]
?
) leads
to a necessary convergence. This is observed from the chain of inequalities 0 ≤ g0(x[k]?) ≤
g0(x
[k−1]?) ≤ · · · ≤ g0(x[0]) as the optimal objective value is upperbounded by any feasible
value. Secondly, the approximate problem (28) shares the same set of KKT conditions as (27)
at the point of convergence, due to the stated properties (i) − (iii). The detailed proof of the
latter case is articulated in [53], also see [60] for a similar discussion.
Lemma III.2. The properties (i) − (iii) stated in Lemma III.1 hold for the approximation
introduced in (23).
Proof: The tightness (ii), and the shared slope properties (iii) are obtained directly by
observing the nature of the inequality (22), as the first-order Taylor approximation of the
differentiable convex term −log(x). The globally lower bound property (iii) is observed since
any first-order Taylor approximation of a convex function is also a global lower bound, see [70,
Subsection 3.1.3].
The combination of Lemma 27 and Lemma III.2 conclude the convergence of the SUIAP
algorithm to a point satisfying the KKT optimality conditions7.
7) Computational complexity: The computational complexity of the algorithm is dominated
by the steps of the determinant maximization in the inner loop. A general form of a MAX-DET
problem is defined as
min
z
pTz + log
∣∣Y(z)−1∣∣ , s.t. Y(z)  0, F(z)  0, (29)
where z ∈ Rn, and Y(z) ∈ RnY ×nY := Y0+
∑n
i=1 ziYi and F(z) ∈ RnF×nF := F0+
∑n
i=1 ziFi.
An upper bound to the computational complexity of the above problem is given as
O
(
γin
√
n
(
n2 + n2Y
)
n2F
)
, (30)
see [56, Section 10]. In our problem n = 2N2A +N
2
B representing the dimension of real valued
scalar variable space, and nY = 2MB + 2ME and nF = 2NB + 4NA + 2, representing the
dimension of the determinant operation and the constraints space, respectively.
7However, due to the non-convex nature of the underlying problem, the global optimality of the converging point may
not be theoretically guaranteed and the obtained solution depends on the used initialization. In Subsection VI-A, the optimal
performance is numerically evaluated by repeating the SUIAP algorithm with several initializations. Although the optimality gap
of the obtained solution may not be theoretically guaranteed, it is observed that the proposed initialization leads to a negligible
gap with the numerically obtained performance benchmark.
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Remark III.1. The above analysis intends to show how the bounds on computational complexity
are related to different problem dimensions. Nevertheless, the computational load may vary in
practice, depending on the implementation, the used numerical solver, and the number of opti-
mization iterations required to obtain convergence. Please see Subsection VI-A for a numerical
analysis on the algorithm computational complexity.
Algorithm 1 SUIAP algorithm for SEE maximization. Cmin (λmin) represents the convergence threshold for outer (inner) iterations.
1: l, k ← 0; λ[0,0] ← 0; Q[0] ← Subsection III-A1 ; . initialization
2: repeat . outer loop
3: l← l + 1; λ[0,l]? ← λ[k,l−1]?; Q[0,l] ← Q[k,l−1]?; k ← 0;
4: repeat . inner loop (Dinkelbach alg.)
5: k ← k + 1;
6:
{
Q[l,k]?, λ[l,k]?
}← (25), (26);
7: C ← CLB,ab
(
Q[l,k]?,Q[l−1]?
)− λ[l,k−1]?Ptot (Q[l,k]?) ;
8: until C ≤ Cmin
9: until λ[k,l]? − λ[0,l]? ≤ λmin
10: return
{
Q[k,l]?, λ[k,l]?
}
IV. SECURE BIDIRECTIONAL COMMUNICATION: JOINT FULL-DUPLEX OPERATION AT
ALICE AND BOB
In this part we study the case where bidirectional communication is established between Alice
and Bob, such that both Alice and Bob are enabled with FD capabilities. An FD bidirectional
setup is interesting as it enables the usage of the same channel for both communication directions,
and leads to a higher spectral efficiency [43]. Moreover, the jamming power at both, Alice and
Bob, can be reused to improve security in both directions8, and potentially improve the resulting
SEE. However, the coexistence of all signal transmissions on a single channel results in a higher
number of interference paths, which calls for a smart design regarding the signal and jamming
transmit strategies at Alice and Bob.
8The reason for this is that the jamming sent to Eve from each single node degrades Eves reception quality from both
communication directions.
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In order to update the defined setup to a bidirectional one, we denote the number of receive
antennas, and the self-interference channel at Alice as MA and Haa, respectively. Moreover,
we denote the data transmission from Bob as qb ∼ CN (0NB ,Qb). Following the same signal
model for the transmission of data and jamming signals as in (1)-(10), the received interference-
plus-noise covariance matrix at Eve, respectively associated with the Alice-Bob and Bob-Alice
communications are expressed as
ΣBDe−a = Σe + κbHbediag (Qb) H
H
be + ρHbeQbH
H
be, (31)
ΣBDe−b = Σe + κbHbediag (Qb) H
H
be + ρHaeQaH
H
ae, (32)
where Σe is given in (16), and ρ ∈ {0, 1} is dependent on the decoding strategy at Eve9.
Similarly, the received interference-plus-noise signal covariance at Alice and Bob are respectively
expressed as
ΣBDa = HbaWbH
H
ba + σ
2
n,aIMA + κbHbadiag (Qb + Wb) H
H
ba + κaHaadiag (Wa + Qa) H
H
aa
+ βadiag
(
Hba (Qb + Wb) H
H
ba + Haa (Wa + Qa) H
H
aa + σ
2
n,aIMA
)
, (33)
ΣBDb = Σb + κbHbbdiag (Qb) H
H
bb + βbdiag
(
HbbQbH
H
bb
)
, (34)
where Σb is given in (15), βa ∈ R+ is the distortion coefficient for the reception at Alice, and
σ2n,a represents the thermal noise variance at Alice. The SEE for the defined BD system is then
obtained as
SEEBD =
{
C˜BDab
}+
+
{
C˜BDba
}+
P BDA + P
BD
B
, (35)
where
C˜BDab = log
∣∣∣I + HabQaHHab (ΣBDb )−1 ∣∣∣− log∣∣∣I + HaeQaHHae (ΣBDe−a)−1 ∣∣∣, (36)
C˜BDba = log
∣∣∣I + HbaQbHHba (ΣBDa )−1 ∣∣∣− log∣∣∣I + HbeQbHHbe (ΣBDe−b)−1 ∣∣∣ (37)
are obtained following the same concept as in (14). Moreover, P BDB := PB +
1+κb
µB
tr (Qb) and
P BDA := PA + PFD, respectively represent the power consumption in the bidirectional system,
9In particular, ρ = 1 indicates the system where Eve is restricted to a linear reception strategy, similar to the other
communication nodes, which represents a favorable (optimistic) scenario. On the other hand, ρ = 0 indicates the system where
Eve enjoys a successive decoding and interference cancellation capability, representing a worst-case (conservative) scenario, see
[36], [62].
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where PA, PB, PFD are given in (11) and (12). In order to obtain a mathematically tractable
framework, similar to (18), we resort to a relaxed version of the SEE by removing the non-
linear operators {}+ from the formulation of (35). The relaxed optimization problem is hence
formulated as
max
Qa,Qb,Wa,Wb∈H
SEEBDp :=
C˜BDab + C˜
BD
ba
P BDA + P
BD
B
s.t. P BDA ≤ PA,max, P BDB ≤ PB,max. (38)
The following lemma explains the effectiveness of the employed relaxation.
Lemma IV.1. Let (Q?a,Q?b ,W?a,W?b) be a KKT solution to (38) for any chosen value of ρ ∈
{0, 1}. Then, it holds
SEEBDp (Q
?
a,Q
?
b ,W
?
a,W
?
b) = SEE
BD (Q?a,Q
?
b ,W
?
a,W
?
b) , (39)
which means that C˜BDab and C˜
BD
ba will be non-negative for any globally or locally optimum solution
to (38), resulting in zero relaxation gap.
Proof: See Appendix C.
A. Extended SUIAP for bidirectional-SEE maximization
By employing the results of Lemma IV.1, it is observed that the SEE maximization problem
(38) shares a similar mathematical structure in relation to the transmit covariance matrices,
i.e., QX ,WX , X ∈ {a, b} as addressed for (18). Hence, a procedure similar to the SUIAP
algorithm can be employed to obtain an iterative solution, with a guaranteed convergence to
a point satisfying KKT conditions. The computational complexity of each Dinkelbach step is
obtained similar to (30), where n = 2N2A + 2N
2
B, nY = 2MB + 2MA + 2ME and nF =
4NB + 4NA + 2.
V. SECRECY ENERGY EFFICIENCY MAXIMIZATION WITH STATISTICAL CSI
It is usually challenging to obtain an accurate estimate of Hae and Hbe, due to the lack of
collaboration from Eve and mobility. In this part, we consider the case where the channel matrices
are known only partially, i.e., only statistical knowledge of Hae,Hbe is available10, considering
10For a non-collaborative eavesdropper, statistical CSI can be obtained via blind channel estimation [68], by channel estimation
based on previously overheard transmissions of the eavesdropper, or via location-based estimation methods [69] in case
information on the environment or potential eavesdropper locations is known. For the scenarios where no CSI-related information
can be extracted, the distribution will hold a uniform probability over all feasible channel values.
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a similar setup as defined in Section II. Remark: In this section Alice is considered to be a HD
node. An optimization problem for maximizing the statistical expectation of the SEE is written
as
max
Q
EHae,Hbe {SEE (Q)} (40a)
s.t. (18b). (40b)
It is worth mentioning that the consideration of statistical CSI on secrecy capacity with single
antenna receivers is studied in [40], considering a fast-fading channel case and extended for SEE
maximization in [37], assuming HD operation of the nodes. In this work, we consider a more
general case, where the channel to Eve may be stationary, however not known accurately due
to the lack of collaboration from Eve. In order to turn (40) into a tractable form we write
EHae,Hbe {SEE} =
EHae,Hbe
{{
C˜ab (Q)
}+}
Ptot (Q)
≈
1
|GC |
∑
i∈GC
{
C˜s,i (Q)
}+
Ptot (Q)
=: SAA (Q) , (41)
where the latter is obtained via sample average approximation (SAA) [41], such that the equality
holds for |GC | → ∞, GC being the index set of the sampled channel realizations. Moreover,
C˜s,i (Q) := C˜ab (Q,Hae,i,Hbe,i) where Hae,i,Hbe,i represent the i-th realization of the channel
matrices drawn from the given distributions. The approximated problem is hence expressed as
max
Q
SAA (Q) s.t. (18b). (42)
Note that the above formulation is still challenging due to three reasons: Firstly, while the
application of SAA turns the statistical expectation into a linear sum for any arbitrary channel
distribution, it results in a high computational complexity as |GC | increases. This calls for a
smart choice of |GC |, compromising accuracy with algorithm complexity. Secondly, unlike the
scenario with perfect CSI and also the case presented in [37], [40] considering a fast fading
channel situation, the {}+ operation may not be ignored. The reason for this is that some of
the channel realizations may result in a negative C˜s, while the statistical expectation remains
effectively positive. And thirdly, similar to the studied problem in (18), the above objective
presents a non-concave over affine fractional program which is not tractable in general.
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A. Successive selection and statistical lower bound maximization (SSSLM)
In order to address the aforementioned challenges, we propose a successive selection and
statistical lower bound maximization (SSSLM) algorithm, which converges to a stationary point
of (42)11. A detailed description of the algorithm steps is given in the following.
1) Initialization: The algorithm starts by generating the channel instances Hae,i,Hbe,i,∀i ∈
GC , drawn from the known statistical distribution of the channels. The number of channel
realizations, i.e., |GC |, should be chosen large enough to capture the channel statistics in SAA
with adequate accuracy, however, should be kept small to reduce computational complexity. The
analytical expression for the choice of |GC | is given in [63, Theorem 5.18], depending on the
required statistical accuracy and the given probability distribution. For the initialization of Q,
we follow the approximation
EHae,Hbe {SEE (Q,Hae,Hbe)} ≈ SEE (Q,E {Hae} ,E {Hbe}) , (43)
where the expectations E {Hae} ,E {Hbe} are obtained from the statistical distribution of the
channels. Note that the right side of the approximation corresponds to the objective addressed
in Subsection III-A, where the SUIAP algorithm is applied. The obtained solution from SUIAP
is then used as an initialization to the SSSLM algorithm.
2) Outer loop: In each outer iteration, the objective is decomposed as
SAA (Q) =
∑
i∈GC1
{
C˜s,i (Q)
}+
+
∑
i∈GC2
{
C˜s,i (Q)
}+
|GC |Ptot (Q) (44)
by separating the set of channel realizations into the disjoint sets GC1 and GC2 , such that
GC = GC1 ∪GC2 . In particular, the set GC1 is updated in each outer iteration as
G(new)C1 ←
{
∀i | i ∈ GC1 or C˜s,i (Q) = 0
}
, (45)
where Q is given from the last intermediate loop, and results in the separation of smooth
and non-smooth parts of the objective in (44). The algorithm converges when the constructed
11Please note that in contrast to Subsection III-A, the operating objective in this part is not a differentiable one, hence it violates
the conditions given by SIA [53]. In this regard we follow a variation of SIA, i.e., the successive upper-bound minimization
(SUM) method [42], generalizing the convergence arguments in SIA-based methods for non-smooth problems. The proposed
SSSLM algorithm is composed of three nested loops: Separation of the SAA into smooth and non-smooth parts at the outer
loop, construction of an effective lower bound to SAA as the intermediate loop, and maximization of the constructed bound in
the inner loop.
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set GC1 does not change. As it will be elaborated, the set members in GC1 incur a high
computational complexity, but are capable of resolving the non-smooth points by maintaining the
same directional derivative as the SAA. On the other hand, the set members in GC2 are resolved
with lower computational complexity, however, they are not capable of handling non-smooth
situations.
3) Intermediate loop: In each intermediate iteration a lower bound is constructed from the
original objective SAA, namely SAALB, using the value of Q from the last inner loop, i.e.,
Q0. In order to construct SAALB we undertake three steps. Firstly, the operator {}+ is removed
from SAA for i ∈ GC2 , which results in a global lower bound. Secondly, concave and tight
lower bounds of the functions C˜s,i are constructed at the point Q0, denoted as Cˆs,i (Q,Q0), by
applying the inequality (22) on the convex parts. Please note that the value of C˜s,i functions
may be negative at Q0 for some i ∈ GC2 , resulting in a bias to the original objective. In order
to obtain a tight lower bound, we define the set
GC+2 :=
{
∀i | i ∈ GC2 , C˜s,i (Q0) ≥ 0
}
, (46)
representing the subset of channel realizations resulting in a non-negative C˜s,i at Q0. The
corresponding lower bound function is then obtained as
SAALB (Q,Q0) :=
∑
i∈GC1
{
Cˆs,i (Q,Q0)
}+
+
∑
i∈G
C+2
Cˆs,i (Q,Q0)
|GC |Ptot (Q) . (47)
It can be verified that the constructed lower bound is tight at the point of approximation, i.e.,
SAA (Q0) = SAALB (Q0,Q0), see Appendix D. The obtained lower bound is then optimally
maximized in the inner loop. The iterations of the intermediate loop converge when Q0, and
hence SAALB, (almost) does not change in subsequent intermediate iterations.
4) Inner loop: The inner loop is dedicated to optimally maximize SAALB, under the original
problem constrains (42). Note that the SAALB is not tractable in the current form, due to the
{}+ operation. In order to obtain the optimum solution we equivalently write the maximization
problem in the inner loop as
max
ai∈{0,1},i∈GC1
max
Q
SAALB, s.t. (18b), (48)
where SAALB is obtained by replacing the terms
{
Cˆs,i
}+
in (47) by aiCˆs,i. Please note that
for fixed values of ai, i ∈ GC1 , the function SAALB is a concave over affine fraction, and
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can be maximized to optimality via the application of the Dinkelbach algorithm. Hence (48)
can be solved by repeating the Dinkelbach algorithm for all 2|GC1 | possible combinations of ai,
i ∈ GC1 , however, requiring a large number of Dinkelbach iterations. The optimization problem
corresponding to the k-th inner iteration is expressed as
max
a[k]∈A[k]
max
Q[k]
SAALB
(
Q[k],Q[0], a[k]
)− λ[k−1]Ptot (Q[k]) (49a)
s.t. (18b). (49b)
where SAALB is the numerator in SAALB, and Q[0] is the point for the construction of SAALB,
given from the intermediate loop. Moreover, the vector a ∈ {0, 1}|GC1 | stacks the values of
ai,∀i ∈ GC1 , and A[k] ⊂ {0, 1}|GC1 |. It is observed that for a given a[k], λ[k−1], (49) is a jointly
convex optimization problem, and is solved to optimality via MAX-DET algorithm [56]. Hence,
the optimum a[k],Q[k] are obtained by repeating the MAX-DET algorithm for all combinations
a[k] ∈ A[k]. The value of λ is then updated by applying the obtained Q[k], a[k] as
λ[k] = SAALB
(
Q[k],Q[0], a[k]
)
/Ptot
(
Q[k]
)
. (50)
Please note that the set A[k], is initialized as {0, 1}|GC1 | but is reduced in each iteration. The
following lemma clarifies this reduction.
Lemma V.1. Let gk(a0) be the optimal value of the objective (49) at inner iteration k, for the
given combination a[k] = a0. Then, if gk(a0) is negative, then the combination a0 will not be an
optimum combination.
Proof: Due to the monotonic improvement of λ in every iteration, and the fact that Ptot ≥ 0,
the value of gk(a0) will never improve after further iterations. This also results in a negative
value of gk(a0) at the optimality. Since at least one of the combinations a ∈ {0, 1}|GC1 | equalizes
the objective to zero at the optimality, the combination a0 will never be optimal.
As a result of Lemma V.1, once a combination a0 results in a negative value of the objective,
then it is safely removed from A for the next iteration, see Algorithm 2. Note that the above
process reduces the required computational complexity, compared to the separately applying the
Dinkelbach method on all combinations, in two ways. Firstly, the parameter λ is only updated
jointly, for all combinations a ∈ A. Secondly, the monotonic reduction in |A| in each iteration,
results in a smaller computational demand in finding the solution to (49).
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5) Convergence: The proposed SSSLM algorithm converges to a stationary point of the
original optimization problem (42). In order to observe this, we first verify the convergence
of the algorithm. Afterwards, we show that the converging point is a stationary point of (42).
It is observed that the constructed lower bound in each step of the intermediate loop is
maximized to the optimality via the application of the modified Dinkelbach algorithm. On the
other hand, the value of SAALB(Q) after the construction of the new lower bound in each
intermediate iteration experiences an improvement. This is grounded on the re-calculation of Cˆs,i
at the point of approximation, and elimination of the channel instances from GC2 which result in
a negative C˜s,i. Since the both the aforementioned updates result in a monotonic improvement of
SAALB(Q) and as the SAA is bounded from above, the iterations of inner and intermediate loop
will result in a necessary convergence. The convergence of the intermediate loop subsequently
results in the necessary convergence of the outer loop, due to the monotonic increase of |GC1|
after each outer iteration, and the fact that |GC1| ≤ |GC |.
In order to argue the properties of the converging point on the original objective, we observe
that neither the SAA nor SAALB(Q) are necessarily differentiable at the point of convergence.
This invalidates the convergence arguments used for SUIAP algorithm from [53]. In this regard,
we follow the guidelines given by the SUM method [42], generalizing the convergence arguments
in SIA-based methods for non-smooth problems.
Lemma V.2. Let Q? be a solution of SSSLM. Then the function SAA, i.e., original problem
objective, and SAALB, i.e., the constructed lower bound at the last intermediate iteration, are
tight and share the same directional derivatives at Q?.
Proof: See Appendix D.
The results of Lemma V.2, together with the fact that SAALB(Q) ≤ SAA(Q) for any feasible
Q, jointly satisfy the required assumption set [42, Assumption 1], and guarantee that the obtained
converging point is indeed a stationary point of the original problem.
Remark V.1. Similar to the SUIAP algorithm, the global optimality of the obtained stationary
point via the SSSLM algorithm may not be guaranteed, and the obtained solution depends on the
used initialization, see Remark 7. In Subsection VI-A, the optimal performance is numerically
evaluated by repeating the SSSLM algorithm with several initializations, where the average
1− 3% relative gap is observed for the proposed initialization in Subsection V-A1.
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6) Computational complexity: The computational complexity of the algorithm is dominated by
the maximization defined in (49), solved via the MAX-DET algorithm in each inner iteration. The
associated arithmetic complexity12 is hence upper-bounded similar to (30), where γin ∝ 2|GC1 |,
n = 2N2A +N
2
B, nY = |GC |(2MB + 2ME), nF = 4NA + 2NB + 2
Algorithm 2 SEE maximization using statistical CSI, via successive selection and statistical
lower bound maximization (SSSLM). Cmin (λmin) represents the convergence threshold for the
intermediate (inner) iterations.
1: k, l,m, λ[0,0,0] ← 0;G[0]C1 ← ∅; GC ,Q[0,0,0] ← Subsection V-A1; . initialize
2: repeat . outer loop
3: m← m+ 1; λ[0,0,m] ← λ[k,l,m−1],Q[0,0,m] ← Q[k,l,m−1]; G[m]C1 ← (45); l← 0;
4: repeat . intermediate loop
5: l← l + 1; G
C+2
← (46); SAALB ← (47);
6: repeat . inner loop
7: k ← k + 1; {Q[k,l,m], λ[k,l,m]}← Dinkelbach’s alg. (49)-(50);
8: until (49a) ≤ Cmin
9: until λ[k,l,m] − λ[0,l,m] ≤ λmin
10: until G[m]C1 = G
[m−1]
C1
11: return
{
Q[k,l,m], λ[k,l,m]
}
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section the performance of the studied MIMOME system is evaluated in terms of the
resulting SEE, via numerical simulations. In particular, we are interested in a comparison between
the performance of a FD-enabled setup, compared to the case where all nodes operate in HD
mode. Moreover, the evaluation of the proposed SEE-specific designs is of interest, in comparison
to the available designs which target the maximization of the system’s secrecy capacity. We
assume that all communication channels follow an uncorrelated Rayleigh flat-fading model with
variance ρX = ρ¯/d2X , where dX is the link distance and depends on the simulated geometry, X ∈
{ab, ba, ae, be}. Moreover, in case that only statistical CSI is available for the channels to Eve, we
12The resulting computational complexity is dominated by the SAA sample size, due to the construction of (41), as well as the
iterations of the outer loop. In order to reduce the resulting computational efforts, the algorithm can be customized to a specific
CSI statistic, e.g., by substituting the SAA a more efficient structure. In this case, the achievable SEE must be approximated for
a specific statistics in a tractable form, which is then used for the purpose of performance optimization in the design algorithm,
e.g., see [71] for a similar approach with Gaussian channels but for a different system objective. Another approach is to eliminate
the operations in the outer loop when occurrence of the non-smooth points is not frequent. Moreover, the obtained initialization
point in Subsection V-A1 can serve as an intuitive low complexity solution.
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Figure 2. Numerical algorithm analysis in terms of the average convergence behavior, initialization, and computational
complexity.
assume that HX =
√
ρX
(
DX H¯X + H˜X
)
, X ∈ {ae, be}, where √ρX H˜X is the known channel
estimate following similar statistics as for the exact CSI case, and
√
ρXDX H¯X is the estimation
error where D enforces the receive-side spatial correlation, and H¯X includes i.i.d Gaussian
elements with unit variance. For the self-interference channels we follow the characterization
reported in [64]. In this respect we have Hbb ∼ CN
(√
ρsiKR
1+KR
H0,
ρsi
1+KR
IMB ⊗ INB
)
, where ρsi
represents the self-interference channel strength, H0 is a deterministic term13, and KR is the
Rician coefficient. The statistics of the self-interference channel on Alice, i.e., Haa, is defined
similarly. The resulting system’s SEE is evaluated by employing different design strategies, and
averaged over 100 channel realizations. Unless stated otherwise, the default simulated setup is
defined as follows: Pmax := PX ,max = 0dB, P0 := PX ,0 = −20dB, µ := µX = 0.9, κ := κX =
βX = −40dB, N := NX = MX = 4, X ,∈ {A,B}. Moreover we set PFD = 014, ρsi = 0dB,
KR = 10, ρ¯ = −20dB, and σ2n := σ2na = σ2nb = σ2ne = −40dB. Three nodes are equidistantly
positioned, with the distance equal to one15.
A. Algorithm analysis
Due to the iterative structure of the proposed algorithms and the possibility of local optimum
points, the convergence behavior of the algorithms are of high interest, both as a verification
13For simplicity, we choose H0 as a matrix of all-1 elements.
14This corresponds to the cancellation methods using a joint passive and baseband techniques, which do not implement auxiliary
transmissions or additional analog circuitry. The impact of PFD is later studied in Fig. 3, addressing a general cancellation method.
15We consider unit-less parameters to preserve a general framework. However, the obtained SEE values can be interpreted as
the number of securely communicated bits per-Hz per-Joule, assuming the power values are in Watt.
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Table I. AVERAGE CPU TIME
Algorithm SUIAP-HD SUIAP-FD SSSLM-HD SSSLM-FD
CPU Time [s]
(Initialization)
17.4
(1.2)
31.1
(1.5)
1.39× 104
(17.7)
6.8× 104
(32.2)
for algorithm operation as well as an indication of the required computational effort. In this
part, the performance of the SUAIP and SSSLM algorithms are studied in terms of the average
convergence behavior and computational complexity. Moreover, the impact of the choice of the
algorithm initialization is evaluated.
In Fig. 2 (a), the average convergence behavior of the SUAIP algorithm is depicted. As
expected, a monotonic objective improvement is observed, with convergence in 5-20 total outer
iterations.
In Figs. 2 (b)-(c), the impact of the proposed initializations for the SUAIP and SSSLM
algorithms are depicted. In Fig. 2 (b) it is observed that for the SUIAP algorithm, the proposed
initialization in Subsection III-A1 reaches close to the benchmark performance16. For the SSSLM
algorithm, the situation is prone to more randomness. This is since, in addition to the choice of
the algorithm initialization, the solution is dependent on the used channel realizations used in
the construction of SAA, see (41). In this regard, the resulting cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the resulting SEE values is depicted in Fig. 2 (c), by examining 100 instances of the
SSSLM algorithm. It is observed that the resulting average SEE differs for different solution
instances, however, within 2− 3% of the relative difference. This value is smaller for a system
with HD nodes, due to the absence of FD jamming and the impact of residual self-interference
which result in a simpler problem structure. The required average CPU time17, for SSSLM as well
as the SUIAP algorithms are depicted in Table I, applied on HD and FD scenarios. Moreover,
the CPU time associated with the proposed initialization methods, which can be considered as
an intuitive but sub-optimal but practical algorithm in each case, are given in parenthesis in the
16The benchmark performance is obtained by repeating the algorithm with several random initializations, and choosing the
highest obtained SEE.
17The reported CPU time is obtained using an Intel Core i5 3320M processor with the clock rate of 2.6 GHz and 8 GB
of random-access memory (RAM). As software platform we have used CVX [65], together with MATLAB 2013a on a 64-bit
operating system.
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second row. It is observed that a design with FD-enabled jamming results in a higher CPU time,
due to the additional problem complexity associated with the choice of jamming strategy and
residual self-interference.
B. Performance comparison
In this part the SEE performance of the FD-enabled system is evaluated via the application of
the proposed SUAIP and SSSLM algorithms, and under different system conditions. In particular,
we are interested in a comparison between the performance of an FD-enabled setup, compared
to the case where all nodes operate in HD mode. Moreover, the evaluation of the proposed
SEE-specific designs is of interest, in comparison to the available designs which target the
maximization of the system’s secrecy capacity. The following benchmarks are hence implemented
to provide a meaningful comparison.
• SEE-FD: The proposed SUAIP (SSSLM) algorithm is implemented using the exact (statistical)
CSI, where Bob is capable of FD operation.
• SEE-HD: Similar to SEE-FD, but with restricting the operation of the nodes to the HD mode.
• CS-FD: The design with the intention of maximizing secrecy capacity. Bob is capable of FD
operation.
• CS-HD: Similar to CS-FD, but with restricting the operation of the nodes to the HD mode.
1) FD-enabled jamming with exact CSI: In Figs. 3 (a)-(h) the average SEE performance of
the defined benchmarks are evaluated, assuming availability of perfect CSI and FD operation at
Bob. Hence, both Alice and Bob are simultaneously capable of transmitting AN, see Fig. 1.
In Fig. 3 (a) the impact of thermal noise variance is depicted. It is observed that a higher σ2n
results in a smaller SEE both for FD and HD setups. Moreover, a marginal gain for FD setup
is obtained compared to the HD setup, if the noise variance is low. This is expected, since FD
jamming becomes less effective when Eve is already distorted with high thermal noise power.
In Fig. 3 (b) the impact of the available transmit power budget (Pmax) for each transceiver
is depicted. It is observed that for small values of Pmax, the resulting SEE is monotonically
increasing with an increase in Pmax. Moreover, the performance of the benchmark algorithms
essentially converge for small values of Pmax. This is grounded in the fact that for a system with
low SNR condition, the positive impact of FD jamming disappears as observed from Fig. 3 (a).
Conversely, for large values of Pmax, the traditional designs result in a rapid decrease of SEE,
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Figure 3. SEE performance of the secure communication system with exact CSI, via the utilization of SUAIP algorithm.
where the proposed SUAIP method converges to a constant value. This is expected, since the
designs with the target of maximizing the secrecy rate utilize the maximum available power
budget, resulting in a sever degradation of SEE. Moreover, a visible gain is observed with the
application of an FD jammer for a high Pmax region. Due to a high Pmax, the link from Alice to
Eve also enjoys a higher SNR, which justifies the application of a FD jammer.
In Fig. 3 (c) the impact of transceiver accuracy is depicted. As expected, a higher value of κ
results in a smaller achievable SEE, both in HD and FD setups. Moreover, it is observed that
FD jamming can be beneficial only for a system with an accurate hardware operation, due to
the impact of residual self-interference. However, results show that targeting SEE as the design
objective results in a significant energy efficiency gain, compared to the traditional designs which
target the maximization of secrecy rate.
In Fig. 3 (d) the impact of Eve’s distance to Alice (dE) is depicted. It is assumed that three
nodes are positioned in a line with a total Alice-Bob distance of 100, where Eve is positioned in
between. It is observed that the system’s SEE increases as dE increase, and Eve gets closer to
Bob. Moreover, the application of FD jamming becomes beneficial only when Eve is located in
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Figure 4. SEE performance of FD, FDD and TDD for secure bidirectional communications.
a close distance to Bob, and hence the channel between Bob and Eve, i.e., the jamming channel,
is strong.
In Figs. 3 (e) the impact of the number of antenna elements at Eve (ME) on SEE is depicted.
As expected, a larger ME results in a reduced SEE as it results in a stronger Alice-Eve channel.
Moreover, the application of an FD jammer becomes gainful for a higher values of ME , in order
to counteract the improved Eve reception capability.
In Figs. 3 (f)-(h), the impact of the transceiver’s power efficiency is evaluated on the resulting
system SEE. In particular, the impact of the zero-state power consumption (P0) and PA efficiency
(µ) are depicted respectively in Figs. 3 (f) and (g). The impact of the additional power con-
sumption for SIC (PFD) on the system SEE is depicted for different noise regimes in Fig. 3 (h),
where the two constant red lines represent the SEE for the HD setup. It is observed that higher
(lower) values of µ (P0, PFD) result in a higher SEE. Moreover, it is observed that a marginal
gain with the application of an FD jammer is obtained for a high µ, and a small PFD conditions.
This is expected, since a small (large) value of µ (PFD) results in a bigger waste of power when
using an FD jamming strategy.
2) Secure bidirectional communication: In Fig. 4 a system with a bidirectional secure com-
munication between Alice and Bob is studied. In particular, a joint FD operation at Alice and
Bob is considered which enables jamming and communication simultaneously at both directions.
Two scenarios are considered regarding the decoding capability at Eve: i) Eve treats interference
from the non-intended information path as noise (corresponding to ρ = 1), and ii) Eve is
capable of decoding, and hence reducing, the received signal from the non-intended information
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Figure 5. CDF of the resulting SEE under various system conditions utilizing the SSSLM algorithm. The solid (dashed) lines
represent the performance of the FD (HD) setups in (a)-(d).
link (corresponding to ρ = 0). Moreover, a setup with HD Bob and HD Alice is also evaluated,
where time-division-duplexing (TDD) or frequency-division-duplexing (FDD) is employed in
order to facilitate a bidirectional communication.
It is observed that the resulting SEE increases with Pmax, however, saturates for high values
of maximum transmit power. Moreover, it is observed that a joint FD operation is capable of
enhancing the system SEE, with a considerable margin, in the studied bidirectional setup. This is
since, due to the coexistence of both communication directions on the same channel the jamming
power is re-used for both communication directions, leading to a higher SEE compared to the HD
setup. Moreover, the Eve’s decoding capability is further decreased in the FD setup considering
the scenario (i), due to the existence of two information links at the same channel.
3) FD-enabled jamming with statistical CSI: In Fig. 5 the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the resulting SEE is evaluated via the application of SSSLM algorithm on 100 problem
instances18, where only a statistical CSI is available for the channels to Eve. We choose |GC | =
100 in the construction of SAA, see Section V, in order to limit the required computational effort.
The CDF of the resulting SEE is then evaluated via the utilization of 10000 channel realizations
for each problem instance, following the statistical distribution defined in the beginning of the
current section and choosing DX as a matrix of all-1 elements.
In Fig. 5 (a) the performance of the SSSLM algorithm with the consideration of the statistical CSI,
18Each problem instance includes a realization of Hab,Hbb.
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is compared to the case where the SUIAP algorithm is applied directly on the channel estimate
matrices H˜X . It is observed that a significant gain is obtained by taking into account the full
channel statistics, however, at the expense of a higher computational complexity. Moreover, the
superior SEE performance of the SEE specific design, compared to the secrecy rate maximizing
designs is observable.
In Figs. 5 (b)-(d) the CDF of the resulting SEE is evaluated for different levels of thermal
noise (σ2n), hardware inaccuracy (κ), and the PA efficiency (µ). Similar to the observed trends for
the scenario where exact CSI is available, a marginal gain is observed in the resulting SEE with
the application of an optimized FD jamming strategy. In particular, the gain of the FD-enabled
system is improved for a system with a high SNR, i.e., a high transmit power budget or a low
noise level, and as hardware accuracy increases.
VII. CONCLUSION
The utilization of FD jamming transceivers is widely known to enhance the secrecy capacity
of wireless communication systems by transmitting AN while exchanging information. However,
this results in a higher power consumption in the system due to i) the degrading impact of residual
self-interference, ii) the implementation of an SIC scheme at the FD transceiver, as well as iii) the
power consumed for the transmission of AN. In this work, we have observed that the application
of FD transceivers results only in a marginal gain in terms of secrecy energy efficiency, for a
wide range of system conditions. However, we have shown that the aforementioned SEE gain
becomes significant for a system with a small distance between the FD node and the eavesdropper
or a system operating in high SNR regimes, under the condition that the self-interference is
efficiently mitigated. Moreover, a promising SEE gain has been observed for a bidirectional FD
communication setup, where jamming power is reused for both directions. We have observed
that for almost all system conditions, the application of an SEE-aware design is essential to
increase the system’s SEE as compared to the available designs which target the maximization
of secrecy capacity. APPENDIX A
DINKELBACH’S ALGORITHM
Let f : Rn → R and g : Rn → R+ be, respectively, a concave differentiable and a convex
differentiable function. Moreover, let X be a convex compact set in Rn. Then, the optimization
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problem
max
x
f(x)/g(x) s.t. x ∈ X (51)
represents the class of concave over convex fractional programs, see [57], [59], [61] for a wide
range of applications and related methods .
Lemma A.1. [55, Section 2] Consider the real-valued auxiliary function
γ(λ) := max
x∈X
f(x)− λg(x). (52)
Then, γ(λ) is strictly monotonically decreasing and convex over λ. Moreover, x? ∈ X is a
globally optimum solution to (51) iff x? = arg max
x∈X
f(x)− λ?g(x) with λ? as the unique zero of
γ(λ).
The purpose of the Dinkelbach’s algorithm [55] is to obtain the unique zero of γ(λ), and
thereby the global optimum of the fractional problem (51). This is implemented via iteratively
evaluating and updating γ(λ) in the decreasing direction, where γ(λ) can be evaluated as a
standard convex problem, see Algorithm 3 for a detailed procedure.
Algorithm 3 Dinkelbach’s Algorithm [55]
1: λ = 0,  > 0, η > ; . initialization
2: repeat
3: x? ← arg max
x∈X
f(x)− λ?g(x)
4: η ← f(x?)− λg(x?)
5: λ? ← f(x?)/g(x?)
6: until η ≥ 
7: return {λ?,x?}
APPENDIX B
SUIAP INITIALIZATION
A. The choice of F and G
As mentioned, the role of F (G) is to direct (suppress) the transmission into the desired
(undesired) direction. Hence, for the design of Qa, i.e., data transmission from Alice, we choose
F← Hab, and G← Hae. Conversely, for the design of Wa we choose F← Hae, and G← Hab.
For the design of Wb we set F← Hbe. However, the choice of G should include the impact of
May 2, 2019 DRAFT
31
distortion terms on Bob, reflecting the effect of residual self-interference. The distortion power
at Bob can be written as
tr
(
κHbbdiag (Wb) HHbb
)
+ tr
(
βdiag
(
HbbWbH
H
bb
) )
= tr
((
κdiag
(
HHbbHbb
)
+ βHHbbHbb︸ ︷︷ ︸
H˜bb
)
Wb
)
,
which consequently results in the choice of G←
(
H˜bb
) 1
2
.
B. Power adjustment
Via the utilization of the obtained spatial beams, i.e., normalized covariance matrices, the
optimal power adjustment on each transmission is seeked to maximize the resulting SEE. In
each case, by fixing the power of the other transmission, the resulting SEEp is written as
SEEp (pX ) =
log
(
αX11p
2
X+α
X
12pX+α
X
13
αX21p
2
X+α
X
22pX+α
X
23
)
γX1 pX + γ
X
2
, (53)
where pX , X ∈ {Qa,Wa,Wb}, represent the power associated with different transmissions. It is
observed from (53) that SEEp → 0 for pX →∞ and SEEp (0) is a finite and non-negative value.
Moreover, SEEp (pX ) is a continuous and differentiable function in the region pX ∈ [0,∞). This
concludes the location of the optimal pX at the problem boundaries, or at the points equalizing
the derivative of SEEp (pX ) to zero, see section B-C for an efficient numerical solution.
C. Efficient implementation
For ease of notation, the objective (53) is denoted as f(pX ) and its numerator is defined as
g(pX ):
f(pX ) =
g(pX )
γX1 pX + γ
X
2
(54)
g(pX ) = log
(
αX11 p
2
X + α
X
12 pX + α
X
13
αX21 p
2
X + α
X
22 pX + α
X
23
)
. (55)
The goal is to find the maximum feasible value λ∗ of the objective function f(pX ) as well as
p∗X for which λ
∗ is achieved. λ∗ is defined as follows:
λ∗ = max
0≤pX≤c
g(pX )
γX1 pX + γ
X
2
. (56)
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It can be seen that the objective f(pX ) is continuous and differentiable. Because pX is bounded
on the closed interval [0, c], it follows from the extreme value theorem that the objective has a
maximum λ∗ on this interval. The optimum pX , i.e. p∗X , is located either on the boundaries of
the closed interval or on a point satisfying
∂
∂p∗X
g(p∗X )
γX1 p
∗
X + γ
X
2
= 0. (57)
Using the quotient rule, (57) can be rewritten as
⇔ g
′(p∗X )
(
γX1 p
∗
X + γ
X
2
)− g(p∗X ) γX1
(γX1 p
∗
X + γ
X
2 )
2 = 0 (58)
⇔ g′(p∗X )
(
γX1 p
∗
X + γ
X
2
)− g(p∗X ) γX1 = 0 (59)
⇔ g
′(p∗X )
γX1
=
g(p∗X )
γX1 p
∗
X + γ
X
2
= λ, (60)
where g′(pX ) denotes the derivative of g(pX ) with respect to pX , given by
g′(pX ) =
2αX11 pX + α
X
12
αX11 p
2
X + α
X
12 pX + α
X
13
− 2α
X
21 pX + α
X
22
αX21 p
2
X + α
X
22 pX + α
X
23
. (61)
Our goal is to convert the maximization problem into a simpler feasibility problem: For a given
value of the objective function, denoted as λ, check if a feasible pX exists. Therefore, equation
(60) is rewritten to:
λ γX1 −
2αX11 pX + α
X
12
αX11 p
2
X + α
X
12 pX + α
X
13
+
2αX21 pX + α
X
22
αX21 p
2
X + α
X
22 pX + α
X
23
= 0. (62)
Equation (62) is a fourth-order polynomial and hence, it can be written as
c4 p
4
X + c3 p
3
X + c2 p
2
X + c1 pX + c0 = 0, (63)
with
c4 = α
X
11 α
X
21 γ
X
1 λ
c3 =
(
αX12 α
X
21 + α
X
11 α
X
22
)
γX1 λ
c2 =
(
αX13 α
X
21 + α
X
12 α
X
22 + α
X
11 α
X
23
)
γX1 λ− αX11 αX22 + αX12 αX21
c1 =
(
αX13 α
X
22 + α
X
12 α
X
23
)
γX1 λ+ 2α
X
13 α
X
21 − 2αX11 αX23
c0 = α
X
13 α
X
23 γ
X
1 λ− αX12 αX23 + αX13 αX22.
Let the roots of (63) be denoted as piX , i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. If there is any real piX ∈ [0, c] for which
f(piX ) ≥ λ (64)
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holds, then λ is feasible. As a result, it is possible to construct the following bi-section algorithm
to find the maximum λ, denoted as λ∗.
Firstly, a closed interval for λ∗ is defined, i.e. λ∗ ∈ [λmin, λmax], where λmin can usually be
defined as
λmin = min {f(0), f(c)} . (65)
Moreover, λmax can be chosen as an upper bound on λ:
λmax =
log
(
max
{
αX11/α
X
21, α
X
12/α
X
22, α
X
13/α
X
23
})
γX2
. (66)
The algorithm finds λ∗ up to some tolerance  > 0. In the first iteration it is verified if λ1 =
λmax−λmin
2
is feasible. Therefore, the roots piX , i ∈ {1, . . . , 4} of (63) are calculated for λ = λ1.
If any piX is real, lies in the interval [0, c] and f(p
i
X ) ≥ λ1 holds, then λ1 is feasible and the
procedure is repeated for λ2 = λmax−λ
1
2
. Otherwise λ1 is infeasible and the procedure is repeated
for λ2 = λ
1−λmin
2
. By construction this algorithm numerically approximates the maximum feasible
objective value λ∗ to arbitrary precision . This algorithm is formally given by algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Bi-Section Power Allocation
1: Input: λmin, λmax, c;
2:  > 0, ` = 0, a = λmin, b = λmax;
3: repeat
4: ` = `+ 1;
5: isFeasible = false;
6: λ` = a+b
2
;
7: Calculate roots pi,`X , i ∈ {1, . . . , 4} of (63) for λ`.
8: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , 4} do
9: if Im
{
pi,`X
}
= 0 and pi,`X ∈ [0, c] and f
(
pi,`X
)
≥ λ` then
10: isFeasible = true;
11: pX = pi,`X ;
12: break;
13: end if
14: end for
15: if isFeasible then
16: a = λ`;
17: else
18: b = λ`;
19: end if
20: until isFeasible and b−a
2
< 
21: return p∗X = pX , λ
∗ = λ`;
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APPENDIX C
PROOF TO LEMMA IV.1
Let A1 := (Q?a,Q?b ,W?a,W?b) be a KKT solution for (36). Moreover, let C˜BDab (A1) < 0,
without loss of generality19. The proof is obtained via contradiction as follows. The Lagrangian
function, corresponding to the problem (36) is formulated as
L
(
Qa,Qb,Wa,Wb,Qa,Qb,Wa,Wb, τa, τb
)
= −SEEBDp + τa
(
P BDA − PA,max
)
+ τb
(
P BDB − PB,max
)
− tr (QaQa)− tr (QbQb)− tr (WaWa)− tr (WbWb) ,
where τa, τb ≥ 0 are slack variables associated with the power constraints, whereas Qa,Qb,
Wa,Wb ∈ H are slack variables for dualizing the semidefinite constraints. Since A1 is a KKT
solution, the directional derivative of the Lagrangian function must vanish for any direction at
the point A1. In order to utilize this property, we observe the behavior of the Lagrangian function
when A1 moves over the directions d (X), such that
d (X) :=
(−UqXUHq ,0NB×NB ,UqXUHq ,0NB×NB) , ∀X  0. (67)
In the above definition, Q?a = UqΛqU
H
q , with Λq ∈ Crq×rq , is the economy-size singular value
decomposition20. Now, let ∇df (x) represent the directional derivative of a function f at point
19The case assuming C˜BDba (A1) < 0 can be argued similarly. Moreover, since KKT conditions are also necessary conditions
for any globally optimum solution to (36), due to the differentiable objective with linear constraints, the given proof in this part
also subsumes the case when A1 is a globally optimum solution.
20This choice ensures that the signal space of the movement UqXUHq remains within the space of Q?a, where rq represents
the rank of Q?a. When Q?a is not rank-deficient, Uq can be simply chosen as an identity matrix.
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x and for the direction d. Then, we have
∇d(X)L (A1) (a)= 0, ∀X  0,
⇒ ∇d(X) −
(
C˜BDab (A1) + C˜BDba (A1)
) (b)
≥ 0, ∀X  0,
⇒ ∇d(X)log
∣∣ΣBDb (A1)∣∣−∇d(X)log ∣∣ΣBDe−a (A1)∣∣
−∇d(X)
(
log
∣∣HabQaHHab + ΣBDb ∣∣− log ∣∣HaeQaHHae + ΣBDe−a∣∣)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
(c)
≥ 0, ∀X  0,
⇒ ∇d(X)log
∣∣ΣBDb (A1)∣∣−∇d(X)log ∣∣ΣBDe−a (A1)∣∣ ≥ 0, ∀X  0,
⇒ tr
(
UHq H
H
ab
(
ΣBDb (A1)
)−1
HabUqX
)
− tr
(
UHq H
H
ae
(
ΣBDe−a (A1)
)−1
HaeUqX
) (d)
≥ 0, ∀X  0,
⇒ UHq HHab
(
ΣBDb (A1)
)−1
HabUq UHq HHae
(
ΣBDe−a (A1)
)−1
HaeUq. (68)
In the above statements, (a) holds asA1 satisfies the KKT conditions. (b) follows from the fact that
∇d(X)Ptot = 0, together with the complementary slackness condition, leading to∇d(X)tr
(
QaQa
)
=
0, and ∇d(X)tr
(
WaWa
) ≥ 0. (c) is obtained by recalling (36), (37) and observing the fact that
∇d(X)C˜BDba (A1) = 0, for the case that ρ = 1, and ∇d(X)C˜BDba (A1) ≥ 0, when ρ = 0. Finally, (d)
follows from the known identities tr (AB) = tr (BA) and ∂log |A| = tr (A−1∂A).
Now, recalling the initial assumption C˜BDab (A1) < 0 yields∣∣ΣBDe−a (A1)∣∣
|ΣBDb (A1)|
(e)
<
∣∣ΣBDe−a (A1) + HaeQ?aHHae∣∣
|ΣBDb (A1) + HabQ?aHHab|
(f)
=
∣∣ΣBDe−a (A1)∣∣
|ΣBDb (A1)|
×

∣∣∣I + UHq HHae (ΣBDe−a (A1))−1 HaeUqΛq∣∣∣∣∣∣I + UHq HHab (ΣBDb (A1))−1 HabUqΛq∣∣∣

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
≤
∣∣ΣBDe−a (A1)∣∣
|ΣBDb (A1)|
, (69)
which leads to a contradiction. In the above inequalities, (e) is obtained by incorporating (36)
in the inequality C˜BDab (A1) < 0 and (f ) is obtained by recalling (68) and employing the matrix
identity |I + AB| = |I + BA|, and the fact that |I + A| ≥ |I + B| for any A  B.
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APPENDIX D
PROOF TO LEMMA V.2
A. Proof of tightness:
Tightness is obtained by observing the equivalence
|FC |Ptot (Q?) SAA (Q?) =
∑
i∈FC
{C˜s,i (Q?)}+ (g)=
∑
i∈GC1
{C˜s,i (Q?)}+ +
∑
i∈G
C+2
C˜s,i (Q?) (70a)
(h)
=
∑
i∈GC1
{Cˆs,i (Q?,Q?)}+ +
∑
i∈G
C+2
Cˆs,i (Q?,Q?) = |GC |Ptot (Q?) SAALB (Q?,Q?) ,
where (g) is obtained by applying (46), and (h) from C˜s,i (Q?) = Cˆs,i (Q?,Q?), see (22).
B. Proof of equal directional derivative:
Let Cs,i := {C˜s,i}+. The directional derivative of SAA at Q? is then expressed as
Ptot (Q?)∇dSAA (Q?)
=
( ∑
i∈GC1
∇dCs,i (Q?) +
∑
i∈G
C+2
∇dC˜s,i (Q?)
)
/|GC | − ∇dPtot (Q?) SAA (Q?) (71a)
=
( ∑
i∈G
C
(d)
1
∇dCˆs,i (Q?,Q?) +
∑
i∈G
C+2
∇dCˆs,i (Q?,Q?)
)
/|GC | − ∇dPtot (Q?) SAALB (Q?,Q?)
(71b)
= Ptot (Q?)∇dSAALB (Q?,Q?) , (71c)
where the set G
C
(d)
1
is defined as
G
C
(d)
1
:= {∀i | i ∈ GC1 and ∇dCs,i (Q?) 6= 0} . (72)
In the above arguments, (71a) is obtained by recalling (41), and the fact that Cs,i (Q?) is positive
and differentiable for any i ∈ GC+2 . The identity (71b) is obtained by considering the possible
situations for ∇dCs,i (Q?):
• C˜s,i (Q?) < 0. Then, Cs,i is differentiable and ∇dCs,i (Q?) = 0 for any direction d.
• C˜s,i (Q?) > 0. Then, Cs,i is differentiable and ∇dCs,i (Q?) = ∇dCˆs,i (Q?,Q?), ∀d.
• C˜s,i (Q?) = 0 and ∇dC˜s,i (Q?) > 0. Then, Cs,i is not differentiable and ∇dCs,i (Q?) =
∇dCˆs,i (Q?,Q?).
• C˜s,i (Q?) = 0 and ∇dC˜s,i (Q?) ≤ 0. Then, Cs,i is not differentiable and ∇dCs,i (Q?) = 0.
Finally, the identity (71c) is obtained by recalling (47), and the tightness property from (70).
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